Abstract. The variability of accounting accruals provides a measure of the normal level of managers' accounting discretion and has important implications for event studies of earnings management. We examine how this measure is related to the economic factors including both firm characteristics and attributes of the disclosure environment. We show that the variability of accruals is related to firm size, leverage, variability of cash flows, operating cycle, growth, and other factors. Significant industry differences and temporal patterns are also found.
Introduction
The study of accrual-based earnings management and, more generally, earnings quality requires a good understanding of the properties of accounting accruals. Although the literature has explored the mean properties in great depth, there has been limited attention to the variance properties of accounting accruals. 1 The purpose of this paper is to study how the variability of accounting accruals differs across firms and across time, what firm characteristics and attributes of the disclosure environment are related to accrual variability, and how variability analysis can shed light on the growing literature on earnings management.
Most earnings management studies in the literature can be classified as event studies: how firms manage earnings in a predicted direction due to a specific motive in an event. The interest there is in the directional shifts of accruals, with the research design naturally centered on the mean properties. Popular models on the conditional means of accruals such as those of Jones (1991) and Dechow et al. (1995) are widely used in event studies to separate discretionary accruals from nondiscretionary accruals. In a simplified sense, those studies can be characterized as attempts to find significant "t-statistics": eventspecific (discretionary) accruals divided by their standard deviations. The focus of those studies is on the numerator (even though they also need to use the denominator). Our focus, however, is on the denominator, the variability of accruals.
There are a number of reasons why the variability of accruals is interesting. First, it provides a measure of the normal level of accounting discretion exercised by managers. A "t-statistic" is statistically significant only when the numerator deviates from the denominator to a certain degree. This means that earnings management is attributable to an event only when the event-specific accruals go beyond the 1 A few exceptions include Warfield et al (1995) who find higher magnitude of discretionary accruals for lower managerial ownership and Richardson (2000) who shows that the degree of information asymmetry is associated with the variability of discretionary accruals. Many studies (e.g. Chaney and Lewis, 1998) examine the variance of cash flows and earnings rather than accruals.
normal level of discretion to a certain degree and becomes "abnormal." Thus, the denominator provides a benchmark measure of the general level of accounting discretion independent of specific events. 2 In addition, the denominator is positively related to the total discretion available to managers in the sense that a large denominator would allow the numerator to be relatively large before significant earnings management for a specific event can be detected. Therefore, the denominator has an economic meaning different from the numerator and has often been justifiably used as a direct measure of earnings quality (e.g., Francis et al., 2002) . This measure is particularly useful in studying how institutional factors such as corporate governance, external monitoring, audit quality, 3 SEC disclosure requirements, FASB stipulations, and economic policies affect managers accounting discretion in normal circumstances. It can be used to address claims such as "earnings management is on the rise" (Levitt, 1998) , when all economic motives are possible and accruals can be managed in either direction (see, e.g., Gu, Lee and Rosett, 2002 for an application).
Second, understanding the variability of accruals has direct implications for event studies based on the mean shift effect. We show that the accrual variance depends on many factors and is systematically different across observations; that is, accruals are heteroscedastic. This implies that in calculating the tstatistics for event-specific accruals, the standard deviation used as the denominator should be individualized for different observations. Existing studies always assume homoscedasticity or identical variance across observations in either cross-sectional or time-series regressions and calculate the t-2 One caveat is that since we do not identify specific events in this paper, our variability measures using all observations also include the effects of some earnings management events and are thus a weighted average of the true normal level and abnormal level of discretion. However, this does not affect the crux of the paper. First, since events have to be relatively rare to be considered "abnormal" (Dechow et al, 1995) , the influence of event-related observations is small. If earnings management events are so frequent as to affect the overall discretion level, then they become "normal" and are precisely what we want to capture. Second, in our sensitivity checks we remove liberally observations with large accruals that earnings management events, if any, should have. Our results do not change qualitatively. Third, we include the event of qualified audit opinions as an explanatory variable both to apply our measure (see below) and to filter out the event effects. Finally, in event studies one can always apply our methods but estimate the variability measures using non-event period observations given that the event has been identified. 3 Becker et al. (1997) show that discretionary accruals for firms with non-Big-5 auditors are higher than with Big-5 auditors. This result is difficult to interpret for firms with a multi-year audit contract with a non-Big-5 auditor. No firm can systematically manage earnings up since discretionary accruals will reverse. The variance method provides more convincing evidence (Francis et al. 1999) .
statistics using an average standard deviation estimate. 4 This can lead to both type I and type II errors in detecting earnings management in event studies. 5 The low test power of existing models documented in Dechow et al. (1995) could be partly attributable to the failure to adjust for the heteroscedasticity of accruals. Although extensive exploration of this issue warrants a separate study, our paper provides the foundation by establishing whether and how the accrual variability differs with economic factors.
Finally, the variability of accruals can also be applied to some events where earnings management is triggered but not all in a particular direction. For example, Pourciau (1993) argues that a new CEO tends to manage earnings down, possibly taking a "big bath," in the year of a nonroutine management turnover. However, the evidence is very weak, with the median of unexpected accruals negative and the mean positive. It is possible that some new CEOs manipulate earnings upward to show his/her ability to deliver a quick turnaround. Similarly, with accounting-based compensation contracts, managers may manage earnings either upward or downward to maximize their bonuses (Healy, 1985) . In these cases, the accrual variance would capture both big-bath and dress-up effects and provide more powerful tests. The economic factors we examine in this paper would then serve as control variables.
Our sample is based on all firm years during 1951-2003. We adopt the Glesjer's (1969) tests on heteroscedasticity to examine the economic factors for the variability of accruals. We find that the variability decreases in firm size, consistent with larger firms having lower operating volatility and managing earnings less possibly due to higher political costs than smaller firms (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986) . Leverage is positively related to the variability of accruals, suggesting that the use of earnings in debt contracts induces managers to exercise more accounting discretion (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986) . 4 In particular, the regression residual variance is estimated as εˆis the residual of observation i, n is the number of observations, and k is the number of explanatory variables. Intuitively, both estimates are an average of individual variances, which is a natural result under the homoscedasticity assumption. Although some papers (e.g. Defond and Jimbalvo, 1994) recognize the potential problem of heteroscedasticity, the White (1980) correction that is typically utilized only corrects for the effects on the significance of regression coefficients. Earnings management, however, is measured by regression residuals or discretionary accruals. Their significance has always been calculated assuming homoscedasticity. 5 In particular, for high variance firms that do not manage earnings, using a relatively low average variance estimate can lead to significant t's, causing misidentification as earnings manipulators. On the other hand, for low variance firms that do manage earnings, using a relatively high average variance estimate can lead to insignificant t's, causing them misidentified as non-manipulators.
The variability of cash flows is highly correlated with the variability of accruals, suggesting that higher operating volatility leads to heavier use of accruals to mitigate the timing and matching problems of cash flows. Firms with longer operating cycles, higher asset growth and losses also exhibit higher variability of accruals. Significant industry effects are found, with regulated firms showing consistently lower variability. As an application to event-specific effects, we examine qualified audit opinions and show that the associated variability is significantly higher, consistent with more active earnings management in either direction when firms are flagged by qualified opinions. After removing the mean-shifting effects of the factors we consider, we find that the variability of accruals increased in the 1960's and 1970's, stayed at the high level in the 1980's, and has declined since the mid-1990's.
Although we focus on accruals in this paper, our results shed light on some other findings in the literature. For example, the strong evidence that large firms exercise less discretion in accruals than small firms may explain partially why analyst forecast errors are smaller for larger firms (Brown et al., 1987) .
Others find an inverse relation between the information content of earnings announcement and firm size (Atiase, 1985; Bhushan, 1989) . They link it to differences in analysts following and argue that more analysts following of larger firms results in greater private information acquisition about these firms. Our results suggest that another reason for larger firms to have smaller earnings announcement surprises is that they exercise less discretion over accruals than smaller firms.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the research design including the models and the economic factors that are hypothesized to be associated with the variability of accruals. Sample is described in Section 3. Empirical results are presented in Section 4.
Conclusions are made in the final section.
Research Design

The Models
Our tests of the variability of accruals are based on the following generic models for the conditional mean and the conditional variance of total accruals:
where for firm i in year t, TA it is total accruals scaled by lagged assets, f(x it ) is the conditional mean of total accruals determined by a vector of variables x it through function f, ε it is the residual or deviation from the conditional mean that is assumed to be independently but not identically distributed as Normal (0,Var(ε it )), and g(z it ) is the variance of the residual determined by a vector of variables z it through function g.
Our main interest is in how the conditional variance Var(TA it |x it ) = Var(ε it ); i.e., the variability of total accruals around the conditional mean, is related to the economic factors z it . From an econometric viewpoint, Models (1) and (2) form a typical case of conditional heteroscedasticity in regressions since the residual variance Var(ε it ) in (1) is allowed to differ across observations depending on z it .
Homoscedasticity that is often assumed in the literature is a special case of the above setup with g(x it ) = c (a constant). Numerous techniques have been developed to test for heteroscedasticity. We adopt Glesjer's (1969) tests, which are more powerful than most omnibus tests for heteroscedasticity (Greene, 1993, p. 396 ) and allow us to directly relate the accrual variance to multiple factors.
Glesjer's tests are conducted following a two-stage process. In the first stage, OLS is run for Model (1) to obtain the residuals. We consider three specifications of function f for the conditional mean of total accruals. The first one is,
In this special case, a becomes the unconditional mean and Var(ε it ) becomes the unconditional or total variance of accruals Var(TA it ). This least restrictive case is interesting because it allows us to examine the total variability of accruals. Jones (1991) argues that the normal level of accruals depends on the economic circumstances and GAAP requirements. Our second mean specification is the familiar Jones Model that has been widely used in earnings management studies,
where ∆Rev it is change in revenues from year t-1 to year t scaled by lagged assets and PPE it is gross property, plant and equipment in year t scaled by lagged assets.
Our third mean specification is an augmented Jones Model,
where z it is the vector of variables used in (2) (with slight modifications as discussed later). Although factors in z it are hypothesized to affect the variability of accruals, we include them in the augmented model to mitigate the concern that the Jones Model may not be fully specified and that some variables in z it may also be related to the mean level of accruals. In this case, these variables could have some indirect effect on the variability of accruals through their effect on the mean.
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In the second stage of Glesjer's tests, residuals from the first stage are regressed on the explanatory variables z it depending on the functional form of g. Glesjer (1969) 
(2′)
Economic factors for the variability of accruals
Economic factors z it that are likely to be related to the variability of accruals include firm characteristics as well as attributes of the disclosure environment. While the factors we consider have been studied in other contexts mostly on their mean shifting effects, we examine their second moment effects on accruals. Table 1 provides a summary of the factors, their expected effects and measurement.
Firm size: Size is one of the most important characteristics of the firm. Relative to small firms, large firms enjoy more the benefits of economy of scale and economy of scope. They are more likely to be mature and operate in a steady state. They also tend to be more diversified, with operating volatilities in different business sectors offsetting each other. All these imply that large firms have lower overall operating volatility and consequently lower variability of accruals. In addition, the political process theory suggests that large firms are more politically sensitive and bear higher political costs once they are discovered to have managed earnings (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986) . Thus, they also have less incentive to manage earnings than small firms. 8 Although it is difficult to distinguish between the two, both operating volatility and political cost arguments predict that firm size is negatively related to the variability of accruals. It can be noted that many attributes of the disclosure environment are also correlated with firm size. For example, large firms tend to be followed by more analysts and institutional investors, have Big-5 auditors, and be listed in NYSE/AMEX.
8 This is different from the mean-shifting size effect in political process theory, which posits that large, politically sensitive firms are more likely to reduce income for political motives. This suggests more aggressive earnings management by large firms. The practice of making windfall profits in the future by reducing current income has been increasingly criticized and the SEC has strengthened its scrutiny into R&D related large write-offs (Levitt, 1998 , see also Hansell, 1998 and Morrow, 1998 . Watts and Zimmerman (1986) recognize the effect of political costs on both the mean and variance of earnings.
Leverage: Watts and Zimmerman (1986) argue that, given accepted accounting procedures, the higher a firm's debt/equity ratio, the more likely the manager selects income-increasing accounting procedures. While they focus on the mean effect of financial leverage, higher debt level can prompt firms to either manage earning up to avoid technical default (Defond and Jimbalvo, 1994) or down to facilitate renegotiation of the debt contracts (DeAngelo et al., 1994) . In addition to providing the incentives, higher debt level also provides a more flexible means to manage earnings through the discretion to recognize short-term liabilities (e.g. warranty expenses or pension liabilities). Thus, we predict that leverage is positively related to the variability of accruals.
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Variability of cash flows: In volatile operating environments, the variability of accruals tends to be higher either to make earnings more informative or as a result of opportunistic earnings management.
First, Dechow (1994) argues that realized cash flows have timing and matching problems that cause them to be noisy measures for performance evaluation purposes. The primary role of accruals is to overcome these problems so that earnings are more informative than cash flows. When firms operate in volatile environments with large changes in working capital and more investment and financing activities, the accruals tend to vary more. One measure for the volatile environments or the "noisiness" of cash flows is the variability of cash flows. Second, firms may opportunistically manage accruals for "income smoothing" (Ronen and Sadan, 1981) . More volatile cash flows also imply heavier use of accruals for this purpose. Gibbons and Murphy (1990) show that a firm's relative performance matters. Similarly, income smoothing is achieved relative to a benchmark. Hence, firms may use deviations of cash flows from the firm norm or the industry norm as the basis for accrual decisions. We predict that the higher a firm's cash flow variability or deviations from the norms, the higher the variability of accruals will be.
Operating cycle: Dechow (1994) argues that the length of a firm's operating cycle is a determinant of the volatility of working capital. When the operating cycle is long, the firm requires large 9 The positive relation could be mitigated by the restrictions in debt contracts on the choice of accounting procedures precisely because of managers' incentives to manipulate reported earnings (Leftwich, 1980; Smith and Warner, 1979) . Creditors may also increase their monitoring level or choose firms exhibiting less earnings management to lend in the first place. However, the discretion level is still likely to be incrementally higher with the debt-related earnings management incentives than without the incentives.
changes in the level of working capital and realized cash flows provide a relatively poor measure of firm performance. Then more accruals may be utilized to reduce the timing and matching problems of cash flows. Hence, we predict that the longer a firm's operating cycle, the higher is the variability of accruals.
Growth: A firm's growth in assets may come from two sources: external financing (including both debt and equity issuance) and internal operating results. Higher leverage from borrowing activities may affect a firm's earnings management behavior as previously discussed. For equity issuance, Teoh et al. (1998a Teoh et al. ( , 1998b find significantly more active accrual-based earnings management when firms raise capital either in the IPO or seasoned equity market. For internal growth that comes from the profit a firm makes, Dechow et al. (1995) show that accruals are correlated with firm performance. Therefore, we predict higher variability of accruals when a firm's growth rate is higher.
Negative earnings: Losses may contain more transitory components than profits due to firms' abandonment option (Hayn, 1995) or accounting conservatism (Basu, 1997) . Part of the transitory components are due to accruals. While these components are negative at the mean, the variance is also likely to be higher given the higher uncertainty about these components. For example, firms with (expected) losses have higher analyst forecast dispersions and larger forecast errors (Gu and Xue, 2004; Hwang et al., 1996) . We predict that the variability of accruals is higher in loss years than in profit years.
Firm age:
More is known about older firms due to their longer histories. Older firms may have less discretion to manage earnings as large deviations from their historical norms are easier to detect.
Firm age is also likely to be correlated with a firm's maturity. Mature firms are likely to be in a steady state of operating and financial performances. Since large firms tend to be older with stable cash flows, the age effect may be partly captured by firm size and variability of cash flows. We predict that older firms have less variability of accruals than younger firms.
Exchange listing: One aspect of a firm's disclosure environment is where its stocks are traded.
For example, only NYSE has required all firms listed on its exchange to have an audit committee consisting entirely of independent directors since 1978. Firms listed on NYSE/AMEX may have more institutional investors and more analysts following. Therefore, the monitoring level may be lower and information asymmetry may be greater for OTC companies. Since firms listed on NYSE/AMEX are generally larger than OTC companies, part of the exchange effect may be captured by size. We predict that the variability of accruals is lower for NYSE/AMEX firms than for OTC firms.
Time trend: There has been considerable discussion in both academic and professional literature of whether traditional historical cost financial statements have lost their value-relevance. Various measures of value relevance suggest that value relevance of earnings has declined over time, especially in recent years, even though the total value relevance of accounting information may not (see Gu, 2003 for a reference list of related studies). Part of the reason could be that earnings have been increasingly managed through accruals. Levitt (1998) makes the specific comment that "earnings management is on the rise and the quality of financial reporting is on the decline." If the variability of accruals reflects the general level of discretion to manage earnings, we predict an increasing time trend in the variability of accruals.
Industry differences and regulation: Accepted accounting procedures and managers'
accounting choices may differ among industries. For example, manufacturing and retail companies have large stocks of inventories and receivables, allowing relatively easier earnings management through inventory valuation and bad debt provisions. Financial variables may be more volatile in some industries (e.g. services) than in other industries, which could provide good camouflage for more earnings management activities than otherwise. For regulated industries, the set of accepted accounting procedures is smaller than for unregulated industries. Regulation reduces the manager's discretion in the selection of accounting principles and limits the flexibility to manage earnings. We expect industry differences in the variability of accruals and, in particular, lower variability for regulated industries.
Auditor quality: Francis et al. (1999) argue that the effectiveness of auditing and its ability to constrain earnings management are expected to vary with auditor quality. High quality auditors are more likely to detect questionable accounting practices and to deter earnings management. They find, in a univariate setting, that companies with non-Big-5 auditors have significantly larger variation in discretionary accruals compared to firms with Big-5 auditors. Thus we predict a similar result. Since large firms tend to hire Big-5 auditors, the incremental effect of auditor quality in the presence of size is subject to empirical testing.
An application -the event of qualified audit opinions: An example of the usefulness of the variability analysis would be an application to an event that is likely to be associated with more earnings management but not necessarily in a particular direction. Factors described above would serve as control variables for the normal discretion level as they are meant to. We choose qualified audit opinions as such an event. Given that questionable accounting practices are detected, auditors are likely to object to the use of those procedures and/or to qualify the audit report. When auditors issue qualified opinions, it is more likely that earnings are managed and the direction of management can be either upward or downward.
Hence, we predict higher variability of accruals for firms receiving qualified audit opinions. As in most studies (e.g., Jones, 1991; Dechow et al., 1995) , total accruals (TA) are measured as: Operating Cycle is the sum of the receivables cycle and inventory cycle (Dechow, 1994 Table 2 summarizes the main variables used in the empirical analysis. As in other studies, mean and median total accruals (TA) are negative and roughly 2% to 3% of lagged assets due to depreciation charges. The absolute values of the residuals from the first stage regressions (|ε|), or deviations of TA from their conditional means, provide our measures of accrual variability according to Model (2′). These measures are between 5.3% to 6.9% of lagged assets at the mean and 3.6% to 4.3% at the median. They are the smallest from first-stage Model (1c), indicating that the total accrual variability from (1a) or the conditional accrual variability from (1b) is partly attributable to variations of factors that are related to the mean levels of accruals.
Sample and descriptive statistics
Sample selection and variable measurement
TA it = (∆CA it -∆Cash it -∆CL it + ∆STD it -Dep it ) /A i,
Descriptive statistics
Mean assets are about $1.2 billion in constant dollars based on the 2003 price level. Since the distribution is highly skewed, we take the natural log of real assets, which brings both the mean and median Size to 5.2. On average, Leverage is about 53%. Both measures of cash flow variability are positively skewed, with means larger than medians. Operating Cycle has a mean of about 141 days, with a median of 123 days and standard deviation of 104 days, similar to those reported in Dechow (1994) .
Asset growth is roughly 13% per year. Firms have losses in 18% of the years and on average are about 14 years old based on the difference between current reporting year and first year of listing in Compustat.
About half of our sample is listed on NYSE/AMEX, and 9% are regulated. For post-1974 data, 83% of firms use a Big-5 auditor, and 80% of firms receive an unqualified audit opinion. are not always as significant as in the univariate case, possibly due to the their collinearity with Size.
Results
Main regression results
Glesjer's tests are performed in the two-stage process. In the first stage, we run cross-sectional regressions based on Models (1a), (1b), and (1c) for each combination of 2-digit SIC code and fiscal year.
Since the second stage is the main focus of the paper, we do not report the first-stage coefficient estimates. For Model (1a), the intercept is the unconditional mean of total accruals within each regression and its magnitude across regressions is very close to the overall mean of total accruals reported in Table   2 . For Model (1b), the estimated coefficients are similar to those from the cross-sectional Jones Model estimation reported in prior studies. The augmented Model (1c) includes additional factors used in the second stage with modifications where appropriate. 12 The mean R 2 from Model (1b) is about 28%, 12 For cash flow variables, we use the signed measures of cash flow deviations from firm norms and industry norms in the first stage rather than the absolute deviations used in the second stage. This is because one of the main roles of accruals is to mitigate the timing and matching problems of cash flows and accruals are directionally related to cash flows (Dechow, 1994; Dechow and Dichev, 2002) . Using unsigned measures does not change our results qualitatively but has lower explanatory power for the conditional mean of accruals. Since first-stage regressions are whereas the mean R 2 from Model (1c) is about 45%, suggesting that many of the second-stage factors are indeed highly correlated to the levels of accruals.
In the second-stage, regressions are run based on Model (2′) with pooled residuals from the first stage. 13 The results are provided in This is consistent with many factors affecting both the mean and the variability of accruals. Model (1c) filters out the interaction between the mean and variability effects and allows us to examine how the factors contribute uniquely to the variability of accruals.
Most of the coefficients in Table 4 take the predicted signs and are significant at less than the 0.01 level. The significance does not change whether we use the White (1980) correction for heteroscedasticity or not. The null hypothesis that all the coefficients except the intercept are zero is strongly rejected, indicating that the homoscedasticity assumption in the literature, or equal variance for either total or discretionary accruals, is problematic. For the right three columns, the coefficients on Auditor are either insignificant or even significantly positive, opposite to the prediction. It appears that the finding in Francis et al. (1999) that the absolute value of discretionary accruals is lower for firms with Big-5 auditors holds only in the univariate setting (correlation coefficients < -0.075 in Table 3 ) but not in the multivariate setting. It is possible that there is indeed no Auditor effect, or that the Auditor effect is subsumed by Size due to the high correlation between them. If we drop Size, the coefficient on Auditor turns significantly negative.
As we argued earlier, the variability of accruals can be applied to certain events where more active earnings management is expected but not necessarily in a predictable direction. We choose the However, even after taking the mean effect out, the variability of accruals is still significantly higher, suggesting a higher level of accounting discretion that may involve both downward and upward earnings management. The relatively small magnitude of the coefficient could be attributed to several causes. For example, qualified opinions are rather broadly defined here. Even for strictly defined qualified opinions, the cause could be disputes over disclosures or genuine financial distress rather than accrual management.
Further, since firms with qualified opinions typically experience financial difficulties, the effect could have been captured partly by other variables, especially cash flow variability, Loss and Leverage (see correlation results in Table 3 ).
Subperiod analysis
Mixed results are found for the Trend variable in Table 4 (1a) is punctuated by a number of spikes, for example, in 1951, 1957, 1968 , and to a lesser extent in 1973, making the detection of trends difficult. These spikes, however, appear attributable partly to the mean-shifting effects of the factors we consider. Once the mean effects are removed with Model (1b) and especially with Model (1c), temporal changes in the conditional variability become much smoother and the trends become more pronounced.
In Table 5 , we present the results with second-stage regressions run for each 10-year interval except the last one with 13 years. 14 This affords us the advantage to examine not only the time trends accounting discretion in managing earnings, then it appears that the claim by Levitt (1998) that "earnings management is on the rise" applies mostly to years before the mid-1990's.
For other factors, the sign and significance of the coefficients on most variables are consistent over different time periods except for the 1950's, but that decade has a small sample size. The coefficients on Age and Exchange are relatively unstable, and are often insignificant or even of opposite sign during . Similarly, Auditor takes a significantly positive coefficient in the 1980's, opposite to the prediction. As discussed earlier, these variables are highly correlated with Size. Dropping Size from the regressions typically returns the coefficients on these variables to the predicted signs with statistical significance.
We also conduct regressions separately for each year and follow the Fama-McBeth procedures to aggregate the coefficients. This precludes us from examining the time trends. The results are similar to those reported in Table 5 for the five time periods. In years with reasonable sample sizes (since 1961), most variables consistently obtain significant coefficients as predicted. Variables with unstable coefficients are those few mentioned above that are highly correlated with firm size.
Other robustness checks
Other than the subperiod tests above, we perform a number of additional robustness checks on results on the time trend within the two intervals. Testing for the exact timing of a structural change is typically difficult and has low test power (Greene, 1993, Ch. 7) .
our results, including alternative subsamples, alternative treatment of outliers, alternative regressors, and alternative models (untabulated, see Gu, 1999 for details of most of these robustness checks). For example, we randomly divide the overall sample into 10 subsamples. The major findings hold in each of the subsample. We also exclude inactive firms from the sample. Only the effect of losses becomes weaker but is still statistically significant. As noted in the sample selection, we truncate the key variables at the 1% level to mitigate the impact of outliers. We also truncate only cash flows and accruals, winsorize rather than delete extreme observations, or use Cook's (1997) D-statistic to identify outliers. The results remain qualitatively similar.
Since we use all observations without identifying specific earnings management events other than those with qualified audit opinions, our variability measures may be affected by the potentially abnormally high accruals of some unidentified events (see footnote 2). We remove observations in the top and bottom 5% of first-stage residuals because earnings management, if significant at all, should fall into these observations. A trade-off of doing this is that they contain normal accruals that just happen to fall into the tails of the distribution like any random variable. Removing them would selectively censor the variation in the dependent variable and bias the coefficient estimates. We find that nearly all variables retain their statistical significance, though the magnitude of the coefficients is smaller. The variables that are no longer significant are Cash Flow Var2 and Audit Opinion. The insignificance of Audit Opinion is expected and precisely shows that qualified audit opinions are associated with extreme accruals and correctly captured by our measure if the observations are not excluded.
We also use alternative measures for some of the factors we examine. For cash flow variability, we try a firm-specific standard deviation of cash flows. For this measure, the variation is between firms, not within firms. This measure is highly correlated with the two cash flow variability measures reported in the paper (correlation coefficients > 0.50). Although it is significantly related to the variability of accruals, its relative magnitude of impact is not as large as the other two. Including all three measures simultaneously often makes one of them insignificant. Another measure of growth is based on sales rather than assets. Its effect is not as high as asset growth but has the predicted sign. For leverage, we separate total liabilities into long-term debt and short-term liabilities. It appears that the significantly positive effect of leverage is driven mostly by short-term liabilities, with long-term debt insignificant. 15 Short-term liabilities need to be soon paid back in cash and can affect a firm's ability to pay long-term debt and drive it closer to debt covenant violation. Thus, even though the obligation to pay short-term liabilities is not directly affected by manipulating earnings, higher short-term liabilities can indirectly provide incentives to manage earnings. Furthermore, as noted before, discretion in recognizing short-term liabilities also provides a flexible means to manage earnings.
Many of the factors we examine such as firm size, leverage and cash flow variability are correlated with risk. Managers may be concerned about the perceived risk of their firms and become cautious in their discretionary behavior when the perceived risk is high. This implies a negative relationship between risk and the variability of accruals. When we include risk in the second-stage regressions using equity beta as a proxy, we find it has a significantly positive coefficient (results available upon request). None of the other variables are qualitatively affected. The positive coefficient on risk is consistent with risk being a consequence of managers' discretionary behavior. In this case, it appears more appropriate to consider the variability of accruals as an explanatory variable for risk rather than vice versa.
Finally, for the first stage models, we use Modified Jones Model (Dechow et al., 1995) 
Conclusions
Based on the Glesjer's (1969) we find that the variability of accruals is higher, suggesting more discretion in accrual management. Part of the total variability of accruals is attributable to the mean-shifting effects of the variables we consider.
Once we remove the mean effects, we find that the variability of accruals increased in the 1960's and 1970's, remained stable in the 1980's, and has significantly decreased since the mid-1990's.
While other studies such as Francis et al. (2002) take the variability of accruals as given and examine its pricing consequences, we study the economic factors that are likely to affect the variability of accurals. The list of factors we examine is obviously not exhaustive. For example, corporate governance structures or analyst following may affect managers' discretionary behavior. However, our study provides a starting point and a methodology that can easily be extended to examine how these and other factors can affect managers' discretionary decisions. The variability of accruals is interesting because it provides a measure of the normal level of management discretion without the need to specify particular economic events. The differing variability of accruals across firms and across time also implies that the statistical significance of existing event studies of earnings management may have been misstated. In addition, the variability study can also be applied to certain event-specific cases where more active earnings management is expected but is not directionally predictable. 27 Table 4 Glesjer's tests: second-stage regression results
First-stage models:
( 1 a )
( 1 b )
( 1 c ) Second-stage model: Table 1 . ** and * denote significance at the 1% and 5% levels (two tailed) respectively. Second-stage Glesjer's tests are performed by regressing the absolute values of the residuals from the first stage on the economic factors. For each year, the variability of accruals is measured as the mean absolute value of the residuals estimated from the first-stage Model (1a): TA it = a + ε it , Model (1b): TA it = α 0 + α 1 1/Assets i,t-1 + α 2 ∆Rev it + α 3 PPE it + ε it , and Model (1c): TA it = α 0 + α 1 1/Assets i,t-1 + α 2 ∆Rev it + α 3 PPE it + b′z it + ε it .
